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The Legal Empowerment of the Poor:
Titling and Poverty Alleviation in
Post-Apartheid South Africa
KAROL C. BOUDREAUX*

Introduction
In 2005 the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor
(hereinafter "LEP"), an independent secretariat, was created under
the auspices of the United Nations Development Program.' LEP's
mission is "built on the conviction that poverty can only be
eradicated if governments give all citizens, especially the poor, a
legitimate stake in the economy by extending access to property
rights and other legal protections to populations and areas not
2
currently covered by the rule of law."
Why did the launching parties 3 create this special initiative to

explore the relationship between the informal economy and poverty
and the links between poverty reduction and more formalized
property rights? 4 The answer, in larger part, is that LEP embodies
* Karol C. Boudreaux is Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George
Mason University. She is also Lead Researcher of Enterprise Africa! and a member of
the Working Group on Property Rights of the Commission on the Legal Empowerment
of the Poor. For their insights and helpful comments and their help with fieldwork, I
gratefully recognize Donald Boudreaux, Eustace Davie, Jasson Urbach, Leon Louw,
Temba Nolutshungu, Jennifer Zambone, Frederic Sautet, and Kyle McKenzie. Daniel
Sacks has provided excellent research assistance. Any errors are mine alone.
1. See The Commission on Legal Empowerment for the Poor, http://www.
undp.org/legalempowerment (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
2. The Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor - Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/faq/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
3. The launching parties of the LEP are the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), Canada, Egypt, Guatemala, Tanzania, and the United
Kingdom. The LEP is an independent secretariat hosted by the United Nations
Development Program.
4. See HIGH LEVEL COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, POVERTY
REDUCTION THROUGH IMPROVED ASSET SECURITY, FORMALISATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
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many of the ideas of Hernando de Soto, an influential Peruvian
economist and one of the LEP's co-chairs. De Soto's work on
economic informality, property titling, and economic development
has been embraced by prominent public figures, among them
former United States President Bill Clinton.5 Importantly, de Soto
helped focus attention on the problem of insecure property rights in
the developing world. De Soto argues that without improvements
to many elements in the legal environment and to the propertyrights environment specifically, the world's poor will remain poor.
Empowering the poor 6 requires meaningful changes to the legal
environment. 7 The legal environment is not destiny, of course, but
the nature of the legal environment perceptibly affects economic
development. 8 Economic development that provides opportunities
AND THE RULE OF LAW, CONCEPT PAPER (2005), available at http://www.undp.org/Legal
Empowerment/pdf/ConceptPaper.pdf.
5. De Soto is the founder and President of the Peruvian Institute for Liberty and
Democracy ("ILD"). Institute for Liberty and Democracy, http://ild.org.pe/ (last
visited Apr. 12, 2008). In a speech on November 15, 2002, President Clinton said: "De
Soto's basic premise is that poor people own $5 trillion worth of assets, but most of it is
dead capital because people don't have provable titles in their little homes or farms or
businesses. If they had provable title, it would be collateral for credit and they could
grow their own economies... It's the most important new idea in economic
development moving around the developing world." President William J. Clinton,
President Clinton Address at the Celebrity Forum Speaker Series, (Nov. 15, 2002),
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/111502-sp-cf-gn-usa-sp-wjc-at-the-celebrity-forumspeaker-series.htm.
6. Poverty can be defined in a variety of ways. For example, SIDA, the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency, states that "a person who is hungry,
insecure, and powerless is poor." See, SIDA, WHO IS POOR?, http://www.sida.se/?d=
126&language=enUS (last visited April 15, 2008). Eradicating "extreme" poverty is the
first of the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals. Extreme poverty is defined
as income of less than $1 per day.
See UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT (2007), at 7, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
pdf/mdg2007.pdf (last visited April 15, 2008). Similarly, the World Bank describes
individuals with income of less than $1 per day as living in "dire poverty." THE WORLD
BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: MANAGING THE NEXT WAVE OF GLOBALIZATION
(2007), at xiii, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2007/Resources/GEP 07 .
Overview.pdf (last visited April 15, 2008). However, poverty is a relative concept in that
what constitutes poverty in the United States would not constitute poverty in a very
low-income country. For example, the poverty threshold for a single person under the
age of 65 in the United States in 2006 was approximately $10,500. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Poverty Thresholds 2006, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/
threshold/thresh06.html (last visited April 15, 2008).
7. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (Harper & Row 1989) [hereinafter DE
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (Basic Books
2000) (discussing needed legal reforms, including reducing regulatory red tape, making
it easier and less costly for the poor to register property, and improving the local rule of
law) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL].
8. See KENNETH DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS (The Brookings Institute 2006)
(discussing the relationship between law and development).
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for many alleviates poverty. 9
As LEP, legal scholars, and
economists recognize, property rights are a vital part of the legal
environment for purposes of economic development.10 Countries
with secure, clearly defined property rights experience more
economic growth than countries that lack these rights. 1 Secure
property rights are, this body of research suggests, a key component
of economic development.12

Given the focus on the role secure property rights play in
economic development, some countries are adopting policies
designed to strengthen the local property environment. 13 One
policy initiative that many developing countries have pursued is
titling real property. 14 Titling programs that provide owners of real
(and, at times moveable) property with documents that establish
ownership claims recognized by the government are not new, but
became especially popular after the publication of de Soto's book
9. For example, economist Jeffrey Sachs writes of Chinese economic development:
"Since 1978, China has been the world's most successful economy, growing at an
average per capita rate of almost 8 percent per year. At that rate, the average income per
person has doubled every nine years, and thus increased almost eight-fold by 2003
compared with 1978. The reduction of extreme poverty in the country has been
dramatic ...In 1981, 64 percent of the population lived on an income below a dollar a
day. By 2001, the number was reduced to 17 percent." JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF
POVERTY 155 (Penguin Press 2005).
10. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, A BETTER
INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT

WDR2005/Resources/completereport.pdf (stating that property rights are one of the
basic requirements for a healthy investment climate and for economic growth).
11. Id. at 79 ("New evidence confirms how important secure property rights can be.
Recent surveys from Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine show that
entrepreneurs who believe their property rights are secure reinvest between 14 and 40
percent more profits in their businesses than those who don't. Farmers in Ghana and
Nicaragua invest up to 8 percent more in their land when their rights to it are secure.").
See also Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, Productivity Differences, 116 (2) THE Q. J.
ECON. 563 (2001); Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopezde-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 (4) J. COMP. ECON. 595
(2003); Erica Field, Property Rights & Investment in Urban Slums, 3 (2-3) J, EUR. ECON.
ASS'N 279 (2005).
12. LORENZO COTULA, CAMILLA TOuLMIN & JULIAN QUAN, BETTER LAND ACCESS
FOR THERURAL POOR: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE AND CHALLENGES AHEAD (Int'l Inst. for

Env't & Dev. ed., 2006), http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/12532IIED.pdf.
13. A current example would be Madagascar, where the government is
implementing a project to create a systematic, locally accessible, and digitized property
titling system. See Hanan G. Jacoby & Bart Minten, Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa
Cost-Effective? Evidence from Madagascar, 21 (3) WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 461 (2007). See
also Camilla Toulmin, Securing Land & Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of
Local Institutions, in HOW TO MAKE POVERTY HISTORY - THE CENTRAL ROLE OF LOCAL
INSTITUTIONS IN MEETING THE MDGS 51 (Tom Bigg & David Satherwaite eds., 2005),

http://www.iied.org/Gov/mdgs/documents/mdg3/ch2_28pp.pdf.
14. See Toulmin, supra note 13, at 51.
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The Mystery of Capital in 2000.15
De Soto argues that property without a title is "dead" capital.
People in the developing world often occupy or own title-less
property that is less useful and less valuable than property in the
Western world, which often has a title. De Soto points out that most
of the poor in the developing world operate beyond the scope of
their nation's legal system: they work in the informal sector; their
businesses are unincorporated; they buy goods and services from
other people in the informal sector; and their homes are held
without title. 16 LEP estimates that upwards of 80 percent of the nonagricultural workforce in sub-Saharan Africa works in the informal
sector. 17 This widespread legal informality, de Soto argues, stymies
economic growth and keeps the poor trapped in poverty. 8 The
poor have difficulty establishing credit histories because they
typically work in the informal sector and face obstacles to opening
commercial bank accounts. They are often unable to (or choose not
to) use their homes as collateral for a loan because they do not have
title to their homes. Because they are not able to leverage the assets
they own, many of those in poverty remain poor.
Some policy makers perceive titling programs as a way to
formalize the property rights of the poor. 19 Formalization is a path
to legal empowerment, and legal empowerment should, de Soto
suggests, help transform dead capital into live capital that the poor
can put to productive use. 20 De Soto argues that "[b]ecause the
rights to these possessions (land, houses, business property) are not
adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into
capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow circles where people
know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan,
and cannot be used as a share against an investment." 21
15. DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7. See also Rosalie Kingwill, Ben

Cousins, Tessa Cousins, Donna Hornby, Lauren Royston & Warren Smit, Mysteries &
Myths: De Soto, Property& Poverty & South Africa, (Int'l Inst. for Env't & Dev't Gatekeeper
Series 124, Working Paper No. 4-5, 2006).
16. See HIGH LEVEL COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR (HLCLEP),
OVERVIEW PAPER 1 (2006), http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/pdf/HLCLEP-

Overview.pdf.
17. Id. at 4.
18. DE SOTO, MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 5-7.

19. There are numerous critics of de Soto, several of whom argue that de Soto's
approach is overly simplistic and that empirically speaking, titling programs have often
led to a disempowerment of the poor because the titling process can be captured by
elites. See Kingwill et al., supra note 15, at 5-7; LORENZO COTULA, CAMILLA TOULMIN &
CED HESSE, LAND TENURE AND ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

AND EMERGING ISSUES, 2-4 (Int'l Inst. for Env't & Dev. ed., 2004) (discussing de Soto's
critics).
20. DE SOTO, MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 7.

21. Id. at 6.
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This article, based on fieldwork conducted in Langa Township,
South Africa, examines the effects of property titling programs in
one community located outside of Cape Town. If property titling is
a path to the legal empowerment of the poor, then results from
titling programs provide important evidence about precisely how
these programs accomplish the goal of empowerment. This article
finds that formalization via titling does provide some benefits to
title-holders. Title-holders invest in improving their homes, which
often raises the value of the home. 22 In turn, home improvement
projects provide entrepreneurial opportunities for a wide variety of
local artisans. Some title-holders use their homes as secure places of
business, generating income that residents use to support
themselves and their families. However, few title-holders put their
newly formalized rights to use as collateral for commercial loans.
This finding suggests that formalizing property rights in an
institutional environment that has other systemic weaknesses will
not transform dead capital into living capital. The poor need more
than a property title to break out of poverty: legal empowerment
will work best in an institutional environment that supports broadbased entrepreneurship and rule of law. 23
Section I of this article discusses the theoretical relationship
between titling programs and economic development. Section II
provides a brief institutional background on Langa Township and
the legal environment of pre-1994 South Africa. Section III discusses
the African National Congress ("ANC") government's development
of a housing policy for South Africa. Section IV explores various
ways in which titles and tenure security are helping to alleviate
poverty in South Africa. Section V addresses problems related to
risk and the use of commercial financing by the urban poor in South
Africa. Section VI analyzes policy implications of the legislative and
regulatory environment in South Africa as it relates to housing for
the poor.

22. There is evidence that housing prices in some of the nations' townships are rising
rapidly. See Gina Shoeman, Soweto Property Market Boom, http://www.bondsafrica.
co.za/BA news.asp?aid=149 (last visited April 14, 2008).
23. Addis Ababa, Private Sector - Key to Economic Growth, ECON. COMMISSION FOR
AFRICA, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.uneca.org/mdgs/Story3September05.asp (The
Economic Commission for Africa recognizes the vital role that the private sector plays in
economic growth. On their website they write: "The private sector gets only a brief
mention in the Millennium Development Goals. Yet, it is business - entrepreneurs,
employers, investors, and workers - who are best positioned to help Africa achieve the
Goals."). See DAM, supra note 8 (discussing the connection between a vigorous rule of
law and economic development).
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I. Titling as a Path Towards Legal Empowerment
Titling property is a legal act documenting the ownership of an
asset as well as legal claims on the asset. 24 Claims include things
such as easements or covenants. 25 From an economic perspective,
property titles are valuable because they convey useful information,
such as location, size, or encumbrances such as easements or liens,
to others. 26 This information lowers transaction costs and facilitates
bargaining and exchange. 27 Buyers in a property market look for
parcels of land (and buildings) that suit their needs. If the rights to
the property they buy are clearly defined and enforceable at law,
then buyers are more likely to care for, and invest in this property
than they would be if their rights were insecure. 28 As Klaus
Deininger notes: "A key justification for secure property rights is
that they provide incentives for investment in land and sustainable
24. A title grants the holder freehold interests, those not associated with a landlordtenant relationship. A title also ensures "that the buyer's ownership rights will be
secured against other claimants." JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND

PRACTICES 941 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 1997). Titles are tracked through title
registration: "Registration provides a public record of the state of the title so that a
purchaser of registered land can verify any interests on examination of the record." JON
BRUCE & JAMES ELY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 495 (Thomson

West 6th ed. 2007).
25. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 24, at 294 (defining an easement as "the right to use or
limit the use of another person's land. Easements are appurtenant or in gross. An
easement appurtenant benefits land owned by the holder of the easement. Such an
easement is viewed as attached to that land and is in a sense part of it. An easement in
gross personally benefits the holder of the easement"). Black's Law Dictionary defines a
covenant as "an agreement, convention, or promise of two or more parties, by deed in
writing, signed, and delivered, by which either of the parties pledges himself to the
other that something is either done, or shall be done, or shall not be done, or stipulates
for the truth of certain facts ...in its broadest usage, means any contract." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 190-92 (5th ed. 1983) (detailing several types of covenants relating to land:
covenants against encumbrances ("a covenant that there are no incumbrances on the
land conveyed"), covenant appurtenant ("a covenant which is connected with land of
the guarantor, and not in gross"), covenants for title ("covenants usually inserted in a
conveyance of land, on the part of the grantor, and binding for the completeness,
security, and continuance of the title transferred for the guarantee")).
26. See KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 48-

51 (2003) (discussing the potential economic value of property titles).
NEWMAN,

See PETER K.

PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE LAW (1998) (explaining

transaction costs: "Transaction costs arise from the transfer of ownership, or more
generally, of property rights. They are a concomitant of decentralized ownership rights,
private property and exchange"). See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. OF L. & ECON. 44 (1960) (classic article on transaction costs).
27. DEININGER, supra note 26, at 51; NEWMAN, supra note 26; Coase, supra note 26, at
44.
28. See generally Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and
Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. OF POL. ECON. (Oct. 1995).
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resource management." 29
In the United States, individuals, corporations, and other
entities often hold freehold titles to land. Freehold titles provide the
title-holder with a broad array of rights, privileges, and
obligations. 30 Drawing on the common analogy that property rights
are composed of "sticks in bundle," people who hold freehold title
to property have thick bundles, as compared to those who have a
leasehold on property or who occupy communal land or an openaccess resource. 31 Tenure in any of these forms (freehold, leasehold,
or communal) can be secure or insecure. Secure freehold title is
typically viewed as the "most valuable" form of tenure because it
provides the greatest scope for potentially lucrative use of property,
as freehold owners are able to sell property and face fewer
restrictions on their use of the property, particularly as compared to
renters or lessees of property. 32 This is not to say, however, that
other forms of tenure are undesirable. The appropriate tenure is a
matter of local circumstances. 33
29. DEININGER, supra note 26, at 9. See also HIGH LEVEL COMMISSION ON LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR (HLCLEP), OVERVIEW PAPER, supra note 16, at 15-16.
30. See Karol Boudreaux, The Role of Property Rights as an Institution: Implicationsfor
Development Policy, 2 MERCATUS POL'Y. SERIES 4-5 (2005). See generally David E. Ault &
Gilbert L. Rutman, The Development of Individual Rights to Property in Tribal Africa, 22 J. L.
& ECON. (1979).
31. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25 (defining a leasehold as "an estate in
realty held under a lease... Rights and privileges which lessor of property has by virtue
of the nature of his lease. The asset representing the right of the lessee to use leased
property."). Thrainn Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 74 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S.
McChesney eds., 2003) (defining open-access as a situation where "everybody is
authorized to enter and withdraw resource units, but no person has exclusive rights
otherwise to manage to or sell the asset." Eggertsson defines common property as a
regime where members "not only have rights of entry and withdrawal, but also full
rights of management and exclusion of non-members").
32. Leasehold tenure, for example, provides for the use of land and/or a building for
a specified period of time in exchange for rent. Use rights are therefore time limited.
Lessees do not have the right to sell the land or the building or space they rent. See
Shayak Barman, Paramita Datta Dey & Anisha Sharma, Land Tenure Security: Is Titling
Enough (Nat'l Inst. of Urban Affairs, Working Paper 06-03, 2006), available at
http://www.niua.org/Publications/working-papers/Land%20Tenure%2Security%20%201s%2OTitling%2OEnough_06.pdf.
33. E.g., DEININGER, supra note 26, at 29 (arguing that "[glroup rights may be
desirable where there are economies of scale in managing the resources so that users
have the option of improving productive efficiency or internalizing harm that co-owners
might do to each other... Similarly, in areas where risks are high and insurance markets
not well developed, the guaranteed access to land that is implied in customary systems
can make an important contribution to greater equity"). See also Toulmin, supra note 13,
at 43 (writing "Many assume that individual titling of full ownership rights represents
the best option. However, lesser forms of rights, such as rights of occupancy and use,
are possible and may provide adequate security.").
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Barrows and Roth discuss how some economists have viewed
the connection between real property titling and development:
Economists using a narrowly defined neo-classical model have
derived the hypothesis, often treated as an empirically
demonstrated proposition, that traditional African systems of
'communal' land tenure are inefficient when land has scarcity
value. By way of contrast, individualized tenure, typically
defined as demarcation and registration of freehold title is
viewed as superior because owners are given incentives to use
land most efficiently and thereby maximize agriculture's
contribution to social well-being. Hence the view that landtenure reform may be an important pre-condition for economic
development,
and that this should be an object of government
34
policy.

As the quote above suggests, one of the (contested) theoretical
arguments that form the bases of titling projects for the poor is that a
system of communal property, which is owned jointly by all
members of a given society - each of whom holds rights to use the
group's resources - but which may not be sold, may not effectively
internalize gains resulting from a rise in property values. 35 A shift
towards greater individualization and formalization of rights may
allow individuals to avoid dissipating these gains. 36 This shift
typically allows for individuals to sell their rights to land and may
occur as a kind of spontaneous response to either increasing
demand for land or technological changes that increase the value of
land, or as a legislative change that allows individuals to register
and claim rights. 37
The rights conveyed in an enforceable formal title may help
promote tenure security. 38 This security is seen as "a precondition

34. Richard Barrows & Michael Roth, Land Tenure & Investment in African Agriculture,
28 (2) J.MODERN AFR. STUD. 265 (1990).
35. See CHANGES IN "CUSTOMARY" LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 5-6 (Lorenzo

Cotula ed., 2007) [hereinafter Cotula, CHANGES]..
36. Ault & Rutman, supra note 30. See also Christian Lund, Rie Odgaard & Espen
Sjaastad, Land Rights & Land Conflicts in Africa: A Review of Issues & Experiences, DANISH
INST. FOR INT'L STUDIES, 2006, http://www.diis.dk/ graphics/ Events/2006/Lund %200d
gaard%20and%20Sjaastad.pdf.
37. Ault & Rutman, supra note 30. See also Lund, Odgaard & Sjaastad, supra note 36.
38. People who have secure tenure are not subject to forcible eviction or other
interference such as land or rental housing or expropriations or by other limits placed on
the right to use and profit from the use of land. See DANIEL AYALEW, STEFAN DERCON &
MADHUR GAUTAM, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A VERY POOR COUNTRY: TENURE INSECURITY &

INVESTMENT IN ETHIOPIA (Global Poverty Research Group ed., 2005),http://www.
economics.ox.ac.uk/members/stefan.dercon/landtenure%20version3.pdf
(discussing
tenure insecurity in a different African country).
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for long-term capital investment, the availability of credit, and the
development of land and labor markets." 39 Titling may allow gains
to be internalized, if and when formalization conveys the value of
the land and its immovable structures to the occupant and the
occupant can then make use of these assets in ways that he or she
values. 40 Titling, in other words, can be viewed as a mechanism for
the legal and economic empowerment of the poor, though in
practice it may lead to very different outcomes. 41 A different
theoretical justification for titling projects might be based on the
concept of enhancing human capabilities through ownership and
responsibility. 42 These justifications for titling programs may be
mutually reinforcing. This would be the case in areas where
transaction costs are low and property markets function in an open
and transparent manner.
In his work, de Soto builds on this insight, arguing that
formalization of property rights by means of titling, and supported
by a functional legal system, transforms an asset into capital that can
be used in myriad ways. As he argues:
[clapital is born by representing in writing - in a title, a security,
a contract, and in other such records - the most economically
and socially useful qualities about the asset as opposed to the

visually more striking aspects of the asset . . . Formal property

forces you to think about the house as an economic and social
concept. It invites you to go beyond viewing the house as mere
43
shelter - and thus a dead asset - and to see it as live capital.

Yet the actual results of titling projects in Africa have been

39. Katherine Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected Failures & Unexpected
Successes of Land Titling in Africa, 27 World Development 1115 (1999); Dwight Haase &
Michael Roth, Land Tenure Security & Agricultural Performance in Southern Africa 1 (Land
Tenure Center Working Paper, 1998) (arguing that "compared with weak or insufficient
property rights, tenure security (1) increases credit use through greater incentives for
investment, improved creditworthiness of projects, and enhanced collateral value of
land; (2) increases land transactions, facilitating land transfers from less efficient to more
efficient users by increasing the certainty of contracts and lowering enforcement costs;
(3) reduces the incidence of land disputes through clearer definition and protection of
rights; and (4) raises productivity through increased agricultural investment.").
40. See id.
41. Titling programs have been criticized for empowering elite and marginalizing
women and minority groups. See COTULA ET AL., supra note 12, at 28. See also Cotula,
CHANGES, supra note 35, at 21, 33.
42. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge
University Press 2000); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (Oxford University

Press1999) (discussing human capabilities and flourishing and economic development).
43. DE SOTO, MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 49-50 (emphasis in original).

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

mixed at best. 44 While there is widespread agreement that tenure
security is vital to promote investment in property, there is
considerable debate about the wisdom of formalizing property
rights in Africa via titling efforts, and of state-led initiatives that
create more individualized property rights in situations where
communal rights may be more appropriate. 45
With regards to the poor and property law, the question is if the
poor are best empowered via titling projects or through some
alternate strategy. Titling projects may be most effective where land
values and returns on land are high and where collateral-based
lending already exists. 46 For the rural poor, however, formal titling
may be less valuable because the benefits that flow from titling may
not exceed the costs associated with implementing a complex
project. This suggests that for some people, using different legal
tools, such as secure certificates to occupy may provide many of the
benefits of titling without the high costs. 47
This study investigates some of the benefits for the poor of the
distribution of property titles in accordance with the Black
Communities Development Act. Property owners in urban Langa
Township currently experience some benefits from more secure
tenure, but they also face a number of barriers that make it difficult
to convert the value of their homes into fully live capital, despite the
ongoing granting of title.

44. Rasmus Heltberg, Property Rights & Natural Resource Management in Developing
Countries, 16 J. ECON. SURVEYS 204 (2002). See also Jean Ensminger, Changing Property
Rights: Reconciling Formal & Informal Rights to Land in Africa, in THE FRONTIERS OF THE
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 165, 175-183 (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds.,

1997); Toulmin, supra note 13, at 44-49.
45. See Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, et al., supra note 39, at 1116-1117 (describing a brief
summary of this debate). See JEAN PHILLIPE PLATTEAU, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL NORMS,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Routledge 2000); Ensminger, supra note 44; JOHN W.
BRUCE & SHEM E. MIGOT-ADHOLLA, SEARCHING FOR LAND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA
(Kendall/Hunt, 1994); SHEM MIGOT-ADHOLLA, PETER HAZELL, BENOIT BLAREL, & FRANK
PLACEINDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS SYSTEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CONSTRAINT ON

PRODUCTIVITY? (World Bank, 2001) (discussing a more extensive discussion of the
potential problems associated with titling projects).
46. See Jacoby & Minten, supra note 13 at 461; DEININGER, supra note 26, at 56.
47. Geoffrey Payne, Director, Geoffrey Payne and Associates, Contribution at Global
Land Tool Networking Meeting: Reviewing Titling & Other Tenure Options (November
24-25, 2005), available at http://tombowen.members.beeb.net/geoff/Publications/Conf
erencePapers/Papers/ ConP-Stockholm.doc.
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II. An Institutional Background
A. Langa
Stretched out behind the gray towers of the Athlone power
plant lies the black African township of Langa. 48 It is one of the
oldest townships in Cape Town; the product of a long history of
racial separation, segregation, and oppression. 49 The effects of this
history are still visible in the housing that exists in Langa: a mix of
hostels, concrete homes, and shacks.
In 1917, there was no Langa. 50 Not until the great influenza
epidemic of 1918 did authorities in Cape Town decide to move some
of the city's black Africans to the south of central Cape Town.51
Langa was a "planned" township, designed to allow for "maximum
visibility of residents by the authorities and hence their control." 52
Black residents of Langa were prohibited from buying land in
the township. 53 As the Natives' Land Act of 1913 barred black
Africans from purchasing or leasing land from non-Africans outside
specially designed native reserves, the Cape Town City Council
owned all of the land and buildings in Langa. 54

48. Townships were urban residential areas in South Africa, specifically set aside for

the use of black and colored South Africans during the apartheid era and before the take
over, in 1948, by the National Party government. Townships had poor infrastructure
and residents were subject to a wide variety of legal impediments to movement,
employment, and assembly.
49. CITY OF CAPE TOWN - HERITAGE RESOURCES SECTION, LANGA HERITAGE STUDYINCEPTION REPORT 10 (2003) (on file with author).

50. In the Xhosa language Langa means "sun," but it is also the first portion of the
name of Hlubi chief, Langalibalele, who rebelled against colonial forces. After
incarceration on Robben Island, Chief Langalibalele was banished to the government
farm Uitvlugt, part of which subsequently became Langa Township. Some say that the
original residents of Langa really named the township in honor of this chief who stood
up to the colonial powers. Id. at 33.
51. Black South Africans were prohibited from owning land outside specific
reserves. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 169-170 (Yale
University Press 2001); NATIVE LANDS ACT, No. 27 (1913). Peter Wilkinson, Housing
Policy in South Africa, 22 (3) HABITAT INT'L 217-18 (1998).
52. Cape Connected, Langa Township, http://www.capetown.at/heritage/city/

langa.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
53. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 163.
54. As blacks could not own land in the township, local governments provided
housing. See PAULINE MORRIS, HISTORIC BLACK HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA 23, 26 (South
African Foundation, 1981). See also NATIVE LANDS ACT, supra note 51; NATIVE (URBAN
AREAS) CONSOLIDATION ACT, No. 25, 1945; Lauren Royston, Security of Urban Tenure in
South Africa, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR,
167, 165-6 (Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002).
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Langa contained relatively few houses designed for families 55
because the South African government adopted a policy of
separating the families of black African migrant workers, allowing
only the men to travel to search for work in urban areas. 56 Today,
the homes built for these workers, block flats of single-sex,
dormitory-style housing called hostels still exist in Langa.
B.

Chronology of Legislation

In 1945, the government passed the Native (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act, 57 which provided the basis for highly restrictive
labor and movement regulations imposed under the apartheid
government. Despite these onerous restrictions on movement, black
Africans continued to move to the cities, and by 1946 South African
towns contained more blacks than whites. 58 In the decades that
followed, this trend continued,5 9 as more and more people,
primarily men, left the Homelands 60 to look for work in towns and
cities.61

Between 1951 and 1980, the population in black townships

62 most of
increased from 5.6 million to over 10 million people,

whom lived in squatter housing or in "backyard" housing - tiny
shacks behind the homes of relatives, without public services, such
as sanitation. 63 In 1954, the Minister of Native Affairs announced
that no more family houses would be built in Langa; instead the
focus would shift to hostels. 64 By 1960, 25,000 people were living in
65
Langa; 18,500 of whom lived in the hostels.
The 1971 Bantu Affairs Administration Act 66 shifted the control

over housing policy from municipalities to the national government
by establishing local advisory boards responsible for overseeing the

55. Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 220-221; MORRIS, supra note 54, at 66.
56. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 186.
57. NATIVE (URBAN AREAS) CONSOLIDATION ACT, supra note 54.
58. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 178.

59. Id. at 195.
60. The Homelands were rural areas set aside by the apartheid government for black
South Africans to live. See Id. at 191.
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id. at 195.
63. Id. at 242; Royston, supra note 54, at 166.
64. MORRIS, supra note 54, at 66 (describing that the hostels "could later be converted
into dwellings for coloured families").
65. The population of Langa was 7,436 in 1941; today, it is approximately 200,000.

State Puzzles Over How to Retain RDP Homes for Social Housing, CAPE ARGUS, Aug. 29,
2005.
66. BANTU AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION ACT, No. 45, 1971.
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Homelands and townships. 67 The national government limited the
availability of housing loans to municipalities for building black
housing in urban areas 68 - a strategy that contributed to the
deterioration of conditions in the townships. 69 Combined, all these
policies created a massive housing shortage for low-income South
71
Africans 70 - a problem that persists to this day.
In an attempt to undo some of the ill consequences of previous
policies, in 1975 the government introduced the option of a thirtyyear lease for black South Africans. 72 In 1978, the government
began to offer ninety-nine year leases. 73 In 1984, the Black
Communities Development Act created a statutory right to these
leases that could, beginning in 1986, be registered. 74 Urban
development expert Lauren Royston, notes:
[Flull freehold ownership rights for black urban dwellers were
created by the Act in 1986 for the first time. Previous forms of
tenure could be converted into ownership... As a result of
demands made by civic associations, a process of privatizing state
rental stock at no charge to occupants began in earnest, called the
'transfer of houses' process. 75
In the late 1980s the housing situation in townships was in flux:
some citizens were registering leases; others were converting shortterm leases into long-term leases; yet others were trying to convert
leases into legal titles to their homes. As a result of advocacy by the
Urban Foundation, the private sector was being given a larger role
in providing housing stock, but was often producing poor-quality
housing.76 Also at this time, the government increased rental fees
for government-provided housing, 77 leading to widespread

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

MORRIS, supra note 54, at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 87, 97.
See South Africa: Government Housing Project Excludes Poorest of the Poor, U.N.

INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Nov. 1, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/

200711010724.html (arguing that 400,000 units of housing are needed in Cape Town
metro area) [hereinafter Government Housing Project].
72. Robina Goodlad, The Housing Challenge in South Africa, 33 (9) URB. STUD. 1629,
1634 (1996).
73. Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 222; MORRIS, supra note 54, at 109.
74. Royston, supra note 54, at 167.
75. Id. See also MARIE HUCHZERMEYER, UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION: INFORMAL
SETTLEMENTS AND URBAN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL 122, 145 (Africa World

Press 2004).
76. Wilkinson, supra note 49, at 222.
77. Id. at 223.
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protests. 78 Many renters either refused to pay the increase or
stopped paying during boycotts. 79 In addition, increased interest

rates in the 1980s made it difficult for some new mortgage
bondholders to meet their commitments.8 0 The rate of default
increased and the banking industry began to grow shy of lending in
81
the townships.
With problems mounting, including huge growth in squatter
settlements (after restrictions on movement, known as influx
controls, were lifted in 1986),82 the government attempted to
accelerate homeownership through a "site and service" effort. 83 The
government provided subsidies (7,500 rand, the equivalent of $2,600
at 1990 exchange rates) 84 to private developers to develop the land;
these developers sold the "improved" or "serviced" property and
85
transferred title to new black owners.
A host of problems followed the implementation of the site and
86
service plans, including scandals over poor-quality construction.
In an attempt to reduce complexity and the overlapping
jurisdictions of central, provincial, and municipal agencies,

87

the

federal government created the National Housing Forum in 1992
with the goal of developing a coherent, non-redundant, effective
housing policy. 88 The Forum's work resulted in the National
Housing Accord (1994),89 which was signed by many stakeholders
in South African society and largely adopted by the new Unity
government, following the historic elections of 1994. The 1994
78. Id.
79. Id. See also Goodlad, supra note 72, at 1632.
80. Mary L. Tomlinson, Efforts and Errors: South Africa's Search to Extend Housing
Finance to Low-Income Households, HOUSING FIN. INT'L, Dec. 1, 2002, http://www.all
business.com/personal-finance/real-estate/1018565-1.html.
81. Mary L. Tomlinson, South Africa's New Housing Policy: An Assessment of the First
Two Years, 1994-1996, 22 (1) INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 139, 144 (1998).
82. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 226; Wilkinson, supra note 49, at 217, 223.
83. Royston, supra note 54, at 167. "Site and service" means that the government
allocated some public lands for the development, by private firms, of individual plots
with a water tap, a toilet, and, in some cases, a foundation and a basic room. See
Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 223.
84. See Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 215-23, 229. Please note that in all other cases
rand was converted at the rate of 6.6 rand/dollar, the prevailing rate in late 2005.
85. Royston, supra note 52, at 167.
86. Id. See also Marie Huchzermeyer, Housing Policyfor the Poor? Negotiated Housing
Policy in South Africa, 25 HABITAT INT'L 305, 309-10 (2001).
87. See Alan Gilbert, Scan Globally, Reinvent Locally: Reflecting on the Origins of South
Africa's CapitalHousing Subsidy Policy, 39 (10) URB. STUD. 1916 (2002).
88. Id. at 1917. The proposals adopted by the Housing Forum reflect the influence of
South African mathematician Dr. George Ellis, a critic of the apartheid government and
its housing policy. He co-authored two key works on the subject: The SquatterProblem in
the Western Cape and Low Income Housing Policy in South Africa.
89. Huchzermeyer, supra note 86, at 304.
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White Paper eventually became the 1997 Housing Act. 90
C. Tenure Security Experiment
Within the borders of Langa an interesting experiment took
place over the past twenty-five years. As noted above, beginning in
the mid-1970s, the government of South Africa began to provide
residents with increased tenure security in their homes. The first
steps involved issuing long-term leases to occupants. 91 Next, the
government made some township homes available for sale to black
residents who, up to that point, had been renters. 92 In 1986, the
government enabled all the black residents of Langa, for the first
time, to purchase freehold title to their homes. 93 Since then, the
post-apartheid ANC government transferred significant numbers of
titles to occupants. 94
As of 2001, over 2,400 residential properties in Langa were held
under freehold title, 95 after both the apartheid-era National Party
government (in its waning days) and the current ANC government
deliberately promoted homeownership. 96 Policies of transferring
title directly to occupants attempted to promote economic growth
and poverty alleviation by giving occupants a greater stake in
society, as homeowners. Government policy makers believed that

90. Royston, supra note 54, at 172; Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 224; Gilbert, supra note
87, at 1917 (all discuss the adoption of the White Paper as the Housing Act in 1997).
91. Lucy Stevens & Stephen Rule, Moving to an Informal Settlement: The Gauteng
Experience, 81 SOUTH AFR. GEO. J. 107 (1999), availableat http://www.egs.uct.ac.za/sagj/
Gauteng.htm ("Reforms of the 1980s that reflected this acceptance (of black African
urbanization) included the abolition of influx controls in 1986, and the sale of township
houses to residents at reduced prices from 1983. Before that reforms had re-introduced
leasehold ownership for Africans on a 30-year leasehold (1975) and later a 99-year
leasehold in (1978)"). See also Royston, supra note 54, at 167 ("The passage of the Black
Communities Development Act in 1984 created a statutory right to 99-year leaseholds.").
92. Stevens & Rule, supra note 91, at 3.
93. Id. (defining Freehold title as "the right of title to land for an uncertain
duration").
94. UPGRADING OF LAND TENURE RIGHTS ACT, No. 112 (1991), amended by GENERAL
LAW AMENDMENT ACT, No.139 (1992); GENERAL LAW SECOND AMENDMENT ACT, No.
108 (1993); LAND AFFAIRS GENERAL AMENDMENT ACT, No. 11 (1995); DEVELOPMENT
FACILITATION ACT, No. 67 (1995); DEVELOPMENT FACILITATION ACT, No. 67 (1995) (legal
vehicles used to accomplish this transfer). See UPGRADING OF LAND TENURE RIGHTS
AMENDMENT ACT 34 § 1, 2 (1996).
95. In 2001, there were 3,172 formal, residential properties in Langa, i.e., homes, not
shacks or commercial property. Of these, 780 were unregistered, and 30 houses were
owned by banks. Personal Communication from Mr. Jens Kuhn, Research Manager:
Housing - City of Cape Town, to author, (Oct. 13, 2005) [hereinafter, Communication]
(on file with author).
96. Huchzermeyer, supra note 86; Tomlinson, supra note 81.
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once occupants had secure title to their houses, they would leverage
this asset in economically creative ways and begin to pull
themselves and their families out of poverty. 97

III. The ANC Government and Its New Housing Policy
The ANC-led government of National Unity that took office in
1994 faced extraordinary problems: a serious housing shortage; 98
poor quality housing stock; 99 housing located far from jobs 1°° and
economic opportunity; 01 serious unemployment; 102 and widespread
problems of poverty. 10 3 The new government adopted the housing
policy, at least in part, to address these concerns. 104
The Housing White Paper of 1994, later adopted into law as the
Housing Act of 1997,105 outlined the government's plans for fixing
the nation's many housing problems. 106 The government committed
to providing a million permanent housing units by 1999.107 The
provision of Reconstruction and Development Programme
(hereinafter "RDP houses") - small concrete block homes that can
be purchased using a government-issued subsidy - accomplished
this goal, though somewhat belatedly. 108
The National Unity government implemented a capital subsidy
program in 1986,109 and it has been a major pillar of post-apartheid
97. Tomlinson, supra note 81, at 140. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING, WHITE
PAPER: A NEW HOUSING POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR SOUTH AFRICA § 4.5.1 (1994)
[hereinafter, WHITE PAPER] (arguing "[hlousing as a process represents more than a
simple economic activity but constitutes the foundation for the establishment of
continuously improving public and private environments within which stable and
productive communities can grow and prosper.").
98. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 283.
99. Royston, supranote 54, at 169-70; THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 242.
100. Royston, supra note 54, at 169-70 (addresses issues of housing problems). See also
Lauren Royston, South Africa: The Struggle for Access to the City in the Witwatersrand
Region, in EVICTION AND THE RIGHT TO HOUSING: EXPERIENCE FROM CANADA, CHILE, THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SOUTH AFRICA, AND SOUTH KOREA (Antonio Azuela, Emilio
Duhau, & Enrique Ortiz, eds., 1998) [hereinafter Royston, South Africa].
101. Royston, South Africa, supra note 100.
102. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 268.
103. Id. at 268, 283
104. Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 224.
105. Royston, supra note 54, at 172 (discusses the adoption of the White Paper as the
Housing Act); Housing Act, HOUSING ACT, No. 107 (1997).
106. Huchzermeyer, supranote 86, at 304; see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 97.
107. Goodlad, supra note 72, at 1.
108. See Ernest Harsch, South Africa Marks a Decade of Freedom, 18 (2) AFRICA RENEWAL
4 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18no2/182
southafr.htm (detailing that 1.6 million RDP homes had been constructed by 2004).
109. Royston, supra note 54, at 167.

Summer 20081

THE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR

housing policy.110 The program provides a one-time lump sum
payment designed to make housing more affordable for low-income
earners. 1 These individuals typically do not receive loans from
commercial banks and instead, the government steps in to provide
financing to allow these people to purchase a house of their own.112
The subsidy is set at a rate that should allow people to acquire a plot
of land, a basic structure, and basic services.1 13 Subsidy recipients
are expected to improve, or "top up," the house after they take up
4
residence.11
The White Paper/Housing Act committed the government to a
number of other policy goals:
" the development of sustainable environments and viable
households and communities;
" the development of a normalized housing market;
* improved access to credit for low-income residents and an
improved public-sector/private-sector partnership to provide
housing; and
problem of poor
" upgrading efforts, in order to address the
115
quality housing stock, among other goals.
Most of these goals have proved difficult to accomplish. Well
over a million RDP houses have been built, but they do not actually
appear to be the successful "starter" homes for people to improve
over time as intended. 11 6 Instead, many consider the RDP homes
undesirable, and recipients sell or abandon the houses, relocating
11 7
within informal squatter communities.
Further, a substantial housing backlog remains.118 The housing
market in townships is only slowly becoming functional, and many
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 176.
Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 225.

114. Id.
115. See

WHITE PAPER, supra note 97.
116. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 283; CAPE ARGUS, supra note 65.
117. The RDP houses are typically 25 sq. meter homes without any internal partitions.
Their small size, coupled with minimal amenities, makes them undesirable. The homes
are often built in dispersed areas, and people who move into the houses tend to lose
access to the deep social networks that exist in informal shack communities. See CAPE
ARGUS, supra note 65.
118. A South African government document notes that: "despite delivering 1,831,00
new subsidized houses between 1994 and March 2005, with another 57,065 sites serviced
and 58,548 houses built between April and September, 2005, the housing backlog
Pocket Guide to South Africa, 2006/2007: Housing, available at
continues to grow."
www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/pocketguide/019_housing.pdf.
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low-income residents continue to face difficulties accessing formal
commercial credit. 119 Criticism of the government's housing policy
has been intense and has, in some cases, turned violent as
frustrations mount among South Africa's poor. 120
A. Effects of ANC's Housing Policy Initiatives: Langa
The effects of the ANC's housing policy can be seen in Langa.
Because it is an old, established township, Langa today has a
relatively small amount of undeveloped land. Instead, homes made
of concrete, hostel (or dormitory) housing, and shacks fill Langa. In
this township, as in other townships in South Africa, the major
housing initiatives include:
o ensuring the effective transfer of titles for formal residences
from the hands of government to the residents;
* upgrading squatter settlements; and
* effectively managing hostel housing, which remains rental
housing.
Of these three facets, the ANC government has largely
succeeded in Langa in accomplishing the first policy goal: the
transfer of over 2,400 titles to formal residences. 121 As this article
focuses on the effects of freehold titling in the township, it does not
address the other two facets.
However, upgrading squatter
settlements and effectively managing hostel housing are extremely
important for the township's residents, as both are important for
increasing standards of living and quality of life. 122

119. Ambrose A. Adebayo & Pauline W. Adebayo, Sustainable Housing Policy &
Practice- Reducing Constraints & Expanding Horizons Within Housing Delivery, available at
http://www.sustainablesettlement.co.za/event/SSBE/Proceedings/adebayo.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2008).
120. E.g., Developing Affordable Housing Ecosystems World Wide, Why Are They
Rioting?,
AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
INST.:
SOUTH
AFRICA,
June
1,
2005,
http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/za/?p=38;
The Winter of Discontent,
SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCAST CORP. NEWS, June 28, 2005, http://www.sabcnews.com/
specialassignment/20050628script.html.
121. Communication, supra note 95.
122. See DEININGER, supra note 26, at 84-87 (discussing the important role of land
rental markets for the poor). See also Banashree Banerjee, Security of Tenure of Irregular
Settlements in Visakhapatnam, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE
URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston

eds., 2002) (discussing the importance of upgrading projects in slum or informal
settlements).
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B. Transfer of Title in Langa in the 1990s
Due to some specific advantages, Langa generally succeeded in
managing deed transfers through the 1990s, despite this process
moving slowly. For example, the township utilized the Langa
Housing Office, which traditionally dealt with issues surrounding
rental housing (the primary tenure type until the early 1980s). The
Housing Office handled and tracked deed transfers (as opposed to
the registration of deeds, which is managed by a national Registry),
which gave it a good, but imperfect, record of the legal owners of
titles in the township. 123 Langa's relatively small size, especially as
compared with the newer townships like Khayelitsha, may also
124
have helped facilitate managing the transfers.
In 2000, a municipal valuation was completed for Langa. The
results showed the "bulk of transfers were complete and owners
known." 125 However, many subsequent sales, particularly informal
sales, may not be properly registered with the national Deeds
Registry. In fact, there is good cause to suspect that informal sales
are not being properly registered, a point addressed below.
Regardless, it is reasonable to argue that, in a procedural sense, the
titling program has largely succeeded in Langa.
If titling has been a procedural success in Langa, has it led to
the kind of economic activity and poverty alleviation one might
expect? The following section identifies some of the beneficial
effects of the government's titling program for Langa's residents.
IV. Tenure Security and Poverty Alleviation
Housing is a critical element in the survival strategy of the poor,
providing them with socio-economic stability as well as a source
of asset creation and savings. Moreover, in urban areas, housing
is an important productive asset that can cushion households
against severe poverty, providing an access point to the urban
economy, particularly through the establishment of home-based
enterprises.126

Secure tenure in the form of title to a house provides a critical
asset for the poor. 127 As noted above, homeowners have a different
123. Communication, supranote 95.
124. While Khayelitsha has over a million residents, Langa may have closer to
200,000. Interview with Anthony van Wyck, Nationwide Mortgage Centre, in Cape
Town, South Africa (Oct. 4, 2005).
125. Communication, supranote 95.

126. C.M. Rogerson, Local Economic Development & Urban Poverty Alleviation: The
Experience of Post-Apartheid South Africa, 23 (4) HABITAT INT'L 515 (1999).
127. See DEININGER, supra note 26, at 43 (arguing "greater tenure security can enhance
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set of incentives than do people who are renting housing. Among
these are incentives to invest in one's home 128 and to use it

129
profitably if one can expect to reap the benefits of profitable use.
Renters typically have a wider set of restrictions on how they may
30
use property than do homeowners.
One potentially profitable way to use one's home is to develop

a home-based business. 131 In Langa, as in many townships, people

often run businesses out of their homes. 132 There is little in the way
of commercial real estate, though there is a commercial strip that is
owned and leased by the local government. Langa residents are
given good reason to operate their businesses out of their homes
when the limited availability of commercial real estate is combined
with few restrictions governing the use of residential property for
commercial purposes. A recent report suggests that just over 85
percent of South Africa's self-employed, many of who work in the

informal sector, work from their homes. 133 Using one's home as a
place for commercial activity is a common strategy for dealing with
high unemployment - people who cannot find jobs in the formal
sector by necessity create their own work, oftentimes from their

access to credit, thereby increasing the value of investment undertaken in situations in
which limited credit supply constrains investment"). See also Timothy Besley & Robin
Burgess, Halving Global Poverty, 17 (3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 16 (2003) (arguing

"obtaining property rights over land in urban areas can also help poor households to
gain access to credit, increase labor supply and improve productivity"). See also Barman,
et al., supra note 32, at 5 (arguing that "lack of secure tenure discourages household
investments and investments in home-based activities").
128. Diana Hunt, Some Outstanding Issues in the Debate on External Promotion of Land
Privatisation, 23 DEV. POL'Y REV. 199, 221 (2005) (discussing work in Kenya
demonstrating greater investment in housing by landowners).
129. See DEININGER, supra note 26, at 247 (arguing "In the rural areas of most
developing countries, land is not only the primary means for generating a livelihood but
often the main vehicle for investing, accumulating wealth, and transferring it between
generations").
130. For example, renters do not hold the "sale" stick in the bundle of property rights.
They also often need approval from the owner to modify or otherwise change the
interior or exterior of a building or apartment.
131. See Graham Tipple, The Place of Home-based Enterprises in the Informal Sector:
Evidence from Cochabamba, New Delhi, Surabaya and Pretoria, 42 URB. STUD. 4 (2005) (a
comparative discussion of home-based enterprises in South Africa and India).
132. Twelve percent of the sample from Township Residential Property Market
Household Survey conducted in 2003-04 runs a business from their home. See
WORKINGS OF TOWNSHIP RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY MARKETS, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS &

IMPLICATIONS 9 (2003),http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/2004/JULY/Shis
akaFindingsPres.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
133. Paul L. Cichello, Hindrance to Self-Employment Activity: Evidence from the 2000
Khayelitsha/Mitchell'sPlain Survey (Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape
Town, Working Paper No. 131, 2005), available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/
d0001752/CSSR.self-employmentOct2005.pdf.
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homes. 134
When people are secure in their ability to remain in their home
and are able to make appropriate modifications or additions to the
house, they will be more likely to invest in a home-based
business. 135 This option may be preferable to renting space from the
local government and dealing with government officials, who have
a reputation for inefficiency and corruption. 136 If an area has little
commercial real estate available, one's home also becomes more
attractive as a business location. And, by using one's home, the
business owner avoids the problem of paying rent, which can at
times be difficult if one is self-employed.
A. House Improvement Spurs Economic Activity
The housing process can have important links with the informal
sector. The informal construction industry, constituting very
small firms and private individuals can itself be
a major source of
137
employment much needed by the urban poor.
Perhaps the most noticeable way that the policy of providing
tenure security and title is having an impact on poverty alleviation
is through individual efforts to improve homes. 38 When property
rights are secure, owners can be expected to invest in improving and
conserving their property, and this is true in Langa. 139
In many sections of Langa, a wide variety of home
improvements are taking place. Some of these are small-scale
upgrades to windows and doors. Some involve the addition of
wrought iron fencing to the front of a house. Yet others are more
substantial upgrades that involve adding a room or rooms and
upgrading the interior space. Exterior improvements are clearly
visible throughout Langa. Interior changes are likely to escape a
visitor's eyes, though they are still taking place.
To make these improvements, Langa residents are hiring

134. Id.
135. This process is similar in agriculture. Gershon Feder & David Feeny, Land Tenure
& Property Rights: Theory & Implications for Development Policy, 5 WORLD BANK ECON.
REV. 135, 141 (1991).
136. Interview with Vicky Mangaliso, Co-owner, Nomzuno Butchery, in Langa
Township, South Africa (Oct. 7, 2005).
137. See Adebayo & Adebayo, supra note 119, at 5.
138. Field, supra note 11, at 1-2.
139. See id. (arguing "Economic theory predicts a straightforward relationship
between individual property rights and incentives to invest in land"). See also Besley &
Burgess, supra note 127, at 1 (demonstrating that "security of tenure increases the
marginal value of irreversible investments").
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cabinetmakers, electricians, and tile layers, as well as purchasing
appliances, paint, and wallpaper. When Langa residents cannot
complete a renovation themselves, they tend to hire other Langa
residents to do the work. 140 This keeps money moving within the
township and provides a signal to artisan-entrepreneurs to develop
or improve their skills in order to gain from a business
opportunity. 141 The demand for artisans, bricklayers, carpenters,
and masons creates incentives for more people to acquire these skills
and set up shop (typically in their homes) to meet the demand of
1 42
other Langa residents.
B. Incremental Change
Small, incremental house improvement is typical among Langa
residents who have freehold title.143 In the late 1980s or 1990s, these
residents acquired title to run-down properties that desperately
needed improvement. With their newly acquired title, people
wanted to, and had incentives to, improve their property. However,
improvements such as replastering walls, building a fence, or
adding on a room tend to be made only gradually and using small
144
personal savings.
The gradual approach to house improvement may be explained
by these residents' employment in the informal sector, which makes
qualifying for a bank loan to do larger renovation projects difficult,
because their income fluctuates over time. The spread of micro145
lending in South Africa has not been as broad as some expected.
140. See Adebayo & Adebayo supra note 119, at 5 (suggesting "The informal
construction industry, constituting very small firms and private individuals can itself be
a major source of employment much needed by the urban poor").
141. See Friedrich von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 (4) AM. ECON. REV.
519 (1945) (an example of the role played by signals in the commodity market).
142. See Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Urban
Poverty in Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1109, 1174-75 (arguing
"[home improvement] gives unskilled, unemployed people the opportunity to become
certified in specific building trades and thereby increases their chances of securing
gainful employment in the future").
143. Incremental change is common in other urban areas in the developing world. See
Mohini Malhotra, FinancingHer Home, One Wall at a Time, 15 ENV. & URBANIZATION 217
(2003).
144. Other studies show a similar reliance on savings as opposed to loans. See Field,
supra note 11, at 4 (showing that in Peru "there are also a significant increase in
renovations financed out-of-pocket and in total investment among non-borrowing
households").
145. See Patrick Meagher & Betty Wilkinson, Filling The Gap in South Africa's Small and
Micro Credit Market: An Analysis of Major Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Issues (Center For
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector at the University of Maryland, Working
Paper No. 02/11, 2002), available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14075-
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For these reasons, among others, traditional banks play little part in
the typical Langa house-improvement project.
Instead,
homeowners slowly improve their properties using personal
savings and savings clubs, 146 with whom people expressed greater
trust, compared to bank officials. These improvements funded by
savings, however incremental, increase the value of the property
and in turn, the homeowners' wealth - wealth that most
homeowners expect to hand down to their children.
C. Savings Clubs as Sources of Financing
The property market in Langa differs from the North American
property market. The trappings of a "modern" real estate market real estate agents, title insurers, and mortgage lenders - are largely
absent (though the use of agents, insurance, and mortgage brokers is
more common in new, privately developed areas).
Personal
networks are essential for transferring property. When transfers do
take place, the transfers may not be formally registered at the Deeds
Office, due to high costs associated with formally transferring
property in South Africa. 147
Transaction costs are high for a variety of reasons. Only
conveyancing attorneys may formally transfer the title deed to a
property. 148
By restricting service providers, this requirement
assures that the prices charged to formally transfer deeds in the
South African registry are higher than they likely would be if other
legal professionals were allowed, by law, to make such transfers. In
addition, properties must be formally valued in order to be sold,
and transfer duties are applied to each sale. 149 Finally, sellers must
pay arrears for rates and services before a formal transfer can take
place, 150 adding yet more costs to the process.
As a result, the majority of older houses in Langa sell by wordof-mouth, and the transaction is paid in cash. Mortgage bonds are

14075.pdf.
146. Savings clubs are informal groups that meet on a regular basis to pool resources,
which are then shared by the members of the groups. Typically, savings club members
will contribute a sum each month and either lend money to members or pay out the
monthly "pot" to one member at a time. See ASAP Africa, Kufusa Mari Rural Savings
Club Project, http://www.asapafrica.org/kufusamari.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (an
example of a savings club project).
147. See infra Section V.C.
148. Deed Registries Act, No. 47 § 15 (1937).
149. FINMARK TRUST, WORKINGS OF TOWNSHIP RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY MARKETS 6

(2004), http://w-ww.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/2004/JUNE/TRPM
150. Id.

Brochure.pdf.
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not commonly used in these transactions 51 - though some people
must resort to bonds, as evidenced by the fact that thirty homes in
Langa were, as of 2005, owned by banks, a result of these
152
homeowners failing to make their mortgage payments.
When commercial banking services are perceived as too costly,
because they are inaccessible for some reason, people may
spontaneously develop self-help institutions such as savings clubs
(know in South Africa as a stokvel or umgalelo) to access capital.15 3
Savings clubs are informal associations of individuals who agree to
contribute an amount of money each month into a communal
"pot."154 Most savings clubs members in South Africa are poorer
black women. 155 One of the group members is awarded the pot
each month, to use as he or she wishes. Some umgalelo members use
the payout they receive to purchase building materials, which then
are used to incrementally build or improve a home. Based on our
discussions with Langa residents, a characteristic of homeowners
who occupy older homes seems to be that they rely on informal
savings clubs, rather than commercial banking institutions, to
accomplish these changes. And because umgalelo members are often
from the same neighborhood, the same church, or work at the same
place, group members feel a strong social pressure to participate in
meetings and contribute in a timely manner. 156
151. Press Release, Finmark, My home is my castle/cluster/townhouse/shack housing in South Africa (August 2007), available at http://www.finscope.co.za/
documents/2007/FSPR06_housing.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) ("59% of South African
adults have never heard of the words mortgage/home loan... 18% have heard the term
but do not know what it means... 91% have never had a home loan from a bank").
152. Communication, supra note 95.
153. Laura du Preez & Charlene Clayton, You Can Bank on High Costs, PERSONAL
FINANCE, Aug. 21, 2004, available at http://http.persfin.co.za/index.php?fSetld=300&
fSectionId=592&fArticleld=2194760 (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). See Financial Diaries
Project - Mimmie and Jonas, March 2004, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/docs/
diaries/UNDPHouseholdPprofile 4th Iinstallment.doc (last visited Jan. 29, 2008)
(discussing how one South African woman used an umgalelo to save money to build a
home).
154. See Noble Scheepers, Stokvels in South Africa: Exploring data discrepancies in the
estimates of stokvel membership, FINMARK TRUST 3-4
(2007), available at
http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/2007/SEPTEMBER/StokvelsSA.pdf
(providing a definition of stokvels, savings clubs in South Africa that are also known
among Xhosa speakers by the name umgalelo).
155. Press Release, TNS Research Surveys, How Full is the Piggy Bank? (October
2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter TNS Survey]. See also Grietjie Verhoef, Informal
FinancialService Institutionsfor Survival, South African Women and Stokvels in Urban South
Africa, 1930 to 1998, 2 ENTERPRISE & SOC'Y 261 (2001) ("[a]lthough not exclusively a
women's phenomenon, stokvels were introduced into black urban life by women").
156. Interview with Thandiwe Tolashe, employee, Mnandi's Chicken Take-Away, in
Guguletu Township, South Africa (Oct. 12, 2005). TNS survey, supra note 155 (notes,
however, that 40% of black saving clubs members do not trust these institutions).
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D. The Benefits of Homeownership
Homeownership is a path towards wealth creation insofar as it
157
creates incentives to invest in and improve an asset: one's house.
Investing in human capital, such as becoming artisan-entrepreneurs,
or investing in a business can also create wealth. 158 It is possible that
people might use title to a house as collateral for a loan that would
allow them to invest in human or other capital, but in Langa this
seems to happen infrequently. Instead, we found that wealth tends
to be created through the use of personal savings and through
individual entrepreneurial activities (such as home-based
businesses).
As a result of holding titles and of living in a relatively stable
institutional environment, property owners in Langa have increased
tenure security. This security creates incentives for owners to
maintain and conserve their asset: their home. 159 These incentives
help explain why Langa residents are working hard to improve
their homes. However, high transactions costs and lack of access to
commercial credit helps explain why residents may rely on informal
savings clubs, rather than on commercial banks, to finance
renovations and expansions.
A related benefit of secure property rights is that they empower
the person who holds them: the person holding the rights makes
decisions about how to use and manage a resource. 160 Langa
residents themselves decide if they wish to add a new fence or new
windows or even a new second story. For people whose lives were
severely constricted by legal oppression, such as occurred under
apartheid, providing secure property rights is one way to grant
them greater autonomy and a freer scope for decision making' 6' something that was sorely lacking under previous regimes. 162 The
legal empowerment of the poor through the vehicle of secure rights
to property is not simply about improving efficiency. Importantly,
it is about empowering individuals to make decisions about how to
use (or not use) resources under their control. Such empowerment
157. See Field, supra note 11, at 15 (arguing "strengthening property rights in urban
slums leads to a significant increase in the rate of residential investment").
158. Besley & Burgess, supra note 127, at 16.
159. Steven E.Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 194
(1995).
160. See DEININGER, supra note 26, at 249-50 (arguing "Secure individual property
rights to land would therefore not only increase the beneficiaries' incentives and provide
collateral for further investment but, if all markets were competitive, would
automatically lead to socially and economically desirable land market transactions").
161. Boudreaux, supra note 30.
162. Royston, supra note 54, at 165-66.
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shifts responsibility for the management of resources towards those
who hold the rights and counters paternalistic systems that see the
poor as incapable, or undeserving, of managing resources.
V. Problems of Risk and Financing
The policy of transferring title deeds to residences from the
public sector to private individuals has been in effect in South
Africa, in one form or another, for two decades. 163 In Langa, the
occupants of many formal residences have acquired freehold title to
their homes, as a part of the titling transfer process largely complete
164
by the late 1990s.
In contrast to what government officials may have expected
and de Soto may predict, evidence seems to indicate that few people
leverage the equity in their homes and use their titles as collateral
for commercial loans. 165 They do, however, use personal savings
and savings clubs to build businesses and improve their homes.
This finding parallels evidence from the United States that suggests
most small businesses are also financed with personal savings, not
with commercial loans. 166
For example, a study conducted by Finmark Trust Township
Residential Property Market (hereinafter "TRPM") conducted in
2003 and 2004 found that seventy-five percent of investments made
in townships are made with personal funds, not with commercial
loans. 167 Further, while there is significant informal economic
activity in Langa, the titling policy by itself does not appear to have
generated a boom in more formal economic activity.
The TRPM project also argued that the resale market in
townships generally functions poorly. The conclusions from these
studies were that:

163. MORRIS, supra note 54; Royston, supra note 54.
164. We note that while formal residences have title, there are no titles for the
informal squatter shacks where many people in Langa still live. This means that the
economic benefits one might expect to see in a community filled with titled homes is
muted in Langa, where many untitled, informal dwellings exist.
165. Other studies reach similar conclusions. E.g., Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do
Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide
Titling Program (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/files/FieldTorerocs.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
166. See AMAR BHIDE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESSES 37-38 (Oxford

University Press 2000).
LOOKING INTO THE
167. See KECIA RUST, DEAD CAPITAL IN THE TOWNSHIPS?
WORKINGS OF THE TOWNSHIP RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY MARKETS, IHSA INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE (2004), available at
OCTOBER/IHSATownships.pdf.

http://www.finmark.org.za/documents/2004/
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* township properties are considerably undervalued;
* property owners are not able to realize the economic benefits
of homeownership;
" there is a "considerable informal secondary (resale) market" in
townships;
" there is a limited supply of finance in old townships;
" the "ease of transactions" in real estate sales is "poor;" and
168
" the old township real estate market is "dysfunctional."
The TRPM studies paint a rather discouraging picture of
township real estate markets, with the exception of newer, privately
developed areas (though again, this may be changing). The studies
explicitly refer to township capital as "dead capital" - a reference to
de Soto's work on informal property, and an important concern.169
However, it is also important to recognize that if the real estate
market in an old township such as Langa is "dysfunctional," this
dysfunctionality has two main causes. First, the high transactions
costs involved in transferring property (conveyancing fees, transfer
duties, and the requirement to pay overdue rates and service
charges before a formal transfer can take place) provide incentives
for less costly, informal transfers.
And broader institutional
constraints (high costs of formally employing labor, see below) drive
many workers into the informal sector and so limit the use of
commercial credit. Taken together, these institutional challenges
contribute to the dysfunctionality in the township property markets.
A. Why People Do Not Use Titles as Collateral
So long as the government respects and enforces the rights they
represent, freehold titles provide individuals who hold them with
tenure security. In turn, secure tenure provides individuals with
incentives to invest in their property, to care for it, and to maintain
it, because by doing so, an individual is more likely to capture
future benefits.170 When it comes time to sell, a well-maintained
house fetches a higher sales price than a poorly maintained house.
In addition, when someone holds the rights to mortgage a property,
they often use that right to access commercial credit. 171 For
example, in the United States, titles to houses are sometimes used as

168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Boudreaux, supra note 30.
BHIDE, supra note 166, at 4.
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collateral for small business loans. 172 Loans from a commercial
lender can help start a business, pay for medical expenses or
education, or some other activity. 173 The right to mortgage property
is one of the many "sticks" in the bundle of rights attached to
freehold title. So why are more title-holders in Langa not using this
stick to obtain loans and build or expand businesses, improve their
homes, or fund education?
There are many reasons for the pattern of reliance on personal
savings and savings clubs over commercial loans in Langa. The
primary reason why people in Langa township do not use their
titles as collateral for commercial loans is that they perceive this as
too risky to be worthwhile. Homeowners in Langa do not want to
risk losing their home for a number of reasons:
" Given the significant housing shortage in South Africa, if one
loses one's home, it would be very difficult to find another. 174
The most likely result of losing a home would be that a
family would need to move into the house of a relative;
" Many formal residences have a shack in the backyard, 175 which
is either home to a relative or a source of rental income for
the homeowner. If the home was lost by foreclosure, the
ability to house family members and/or the right to rental
income would also be lost;
" Homes also often serve as the locus for a business. If the house
is placed at risk by a commercial loan, so too is the place of
business;
e The home has a very high cultural value as the family "seat."
Parents and maybe grandparents lived in the house, and
typically the current owner wants to keep the home to give to
his or her children; 176 and
172. Id.
173. Id. at 37-38.
174. See Government Housing Project,supra note 71.
175. Morris notes that in 1997, 30 percent of all Sowetans lived in backyard, shack
dwellings. He states that "about half of all council (old township) homes have at least
one backyard structure on the property." Alan Morris, Continuity or Rupture: The City,
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 65 (4) SOc. RES. 759, 763 (1998), available at http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m2267/is4_65/ai 54098118 (follow p. "4" hyperlink).
176. In our interview with Mr. Mhlongo, he told us that people prefer to stay in
Langa. "It's where their parents were, where their parents died, where they grew up,
and they don't want to lose such a place," he said. So, even if people move out of Langa,
they will still hold onto the family home, even if it's empty, for the sake of protecting
this family property. Mr. Mhlongo said that even those people who are still in rental
property consider it "theirs," as does the community, and that if they move and leave
this property vacant, it is nearly impossible for the city to put new tenants in because the
property should be kept for the "owners." Interview with Ronald Mhlongo, in Langa
Township, South Africa (Oct. 12, 2005).
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e For people who lived with severe insecurity under apartheid

governments, it may be especially valuable to hold
ownership rights and the increased sense of security these
provide. Black South Africans faced enormous institutional
barriers in obtaining formal housing in the Cape Town area.
For those who fought hard to get a177house, retaining the house
may have a high emotional value.

With such significant risk involved in the use of a title as
collateral for commercial credit, it is understandable why many
Langa homeowners forgo the use of this "stick" in their bundle of
property rights.
B. Access to Credit and Banking Concerns
People who rely on personal savings do not face trust issues 178
- they presumably trust themselves with the money they save. For
people who use a savings club rather than a bank loan, trust and
reliability seem to play an important role in their choice of how to
obtain capital. Members of a savings club can monitor other club
members and ensure their compliance through peer pressure,

similar to the pressure found in micro-finance organizations. Club
members expect to receive their payout because of this very real,
albeit informal, pressure. People may not have the same sense of
trust with a commercial bank because they lack personal relations
179
with bank personnel.

And yet, commercial banking might provide an alternative to
people in a situation of transition from person to impersonal
exchange. 180 Commercial banks do not, however, actively lend in
177. Interview with Temba Nolutshungu, Director, Free Market Foundation, in Cape
Town, South Africa (Oct. 10, 2005).
178. See Meagher & Wilkinson, supra note 143, at 4 arguing "Banks, insurance
companies, building societies, and other formal sector financial institutions did not serve
the majority of the population. Understandably, there was antagonism between such
institutions and those now designated 'previously disadvantaged South Africans.'
Thus, most South Africans were oriented not to trust or to use the institutions most able
to provide investment and business-related services."
179. However, primary reliance on trust relationships can have real drawbacks. Trust
allows parties to behave informally and avoid the transaction costs associated with
formality, but this trust works best when communities are homogenous. As more
people move into Langa who have no history in the township and are "strangers," the
community will become increasingly heterogeneous, and it will become more costly to
rely on informal trust arrangements because strangers may not share the same values
and social norms as long-time citizens.
180. See, Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5(1) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 97,
99-100 (1991) (discussing the transition from local exchange in small dense social
networks with low transaction costs to wider ranging long-distance exchange with
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the low-income segment of the South African market. There are
several reasons for this:
" Commercial lenders have experienced a variety of challenges
in the low-income market. Default rates have been high, 181
and repossessing homes has proved difficult. 182 To date,
banks have shown little interest in lenders who earn less than
been a
5,000 rand/month. 183 For banks, this has 18not
4
profitable market, though this may be changing;
" Banks have been hesitant to lend to people working in the
informal sector, given their sporadic income. Many Langa
residents would face this barrier if they applied for a
commercial loan as they do work in the informal sector;
* Banks charge relatively high fees and provide relatively low
returns. Banks charge annual fees on accounts, as well as a
fee for each transaction. Banks charge for making a deposit,
an anomaly compared with banks in the rest of the world.
And, importantly, South Africans pay "far higher interest
charges on their home loans than consumers in other
countries." 185 This helps explain the relative lack of lending
and banking activity in areas such as Langa;
" There is a history in South Africa of defaults in townships
followed by real difficulties in repossessing property. Strong
social norms and community action work together to prevent
evictions and repossession. This makes lending in such areas
costlier for banks; 186 and
* Lenders require homeowners seeking home improvement
loans to prove they are using certified artisans, an
impersonal contract enforcement).
181. A. Pillay & W.A. Naude, Financing Low-Income Housing in South Africa: Borrower
Experiences & Perceptionsof Banks, 30 HABITAT INT'L 872, 873 (2006).
182. Caroline Hooper-Box, Low-Cost Homes Leave Banks Rlbn in the Red, IOL (Cape
Town, South Africa), Aug. 17, 2002, available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set-id=

1&click id=13&artid=ct20020817215216333H252538.
183. Meagher & Wilkinson, supra note 145, at 4 (arguing that there is a history of "a
very narrow client base (economically and racially).... banks and other financial
institutions did not provide services to low-end consumers or small businesses for a
long time, concentrating instead on corporations and white citizens."). The government
and the financial services industry did reach an agreement called the Financial Sector
Charter, a voluntary agreement designed to implement a strategy for effective black
economic empowerment that also commits the industry to expand lending in lowincome markets. Indeed, banks have publicly committed to investing 42 million rand
towards low-income housing by 2008. Id. See also On the House, BUSINESS DAY (Cape
Town, South Africa), Feb. 9, 2006, 12 availableat http://www.businessday.co.za/
articles/article.aspx?ID=BD4A152258 and Meagher & Wilkinson, supra note 145, at 4.
184. See The Hidden Wealth of the Poor, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2005, at 4 (discussing
the spread of for-profit financial services from the developed to the developing world).
185. See du Preez & Clayton supra note 153.
186. See Adebayo & Adebayo, supra note 119, at 6.
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understandable policy but one that makes it costlier for
homeowners to use commercial loans.
For many people, the formalities and complexities involved in
getting a home loan are too high. Saving for a down payment can
be difficult, and with extremely high mortgage bond (real) interest
rates, making monthly payments can present a real hurdle.1 87 In
addition, the process intimidates many and is costly in terms of time
and effort. Grappling with the paperwork involved in applying for
a commercial loan can be difficult. Complying with requirements to
produce supporting documents can prove complicated. There are
few banking facilities in townships, though this seems to be
changing with the introduction of banking kiosks. Kiosks do not,
however, provide the same level of service as a bank office where
one can meet with a loan officer.
Faced with a choice between two methods of housing
finance - the personal savings option and a bank loan, even a loan
with minimal compliance hurdles - by and large, the expressed
preference is still for the former. People who have built their houses
often mention that despite the fact that this route takes an awfully
long time - in many cases years - at the end of the day when the

house is finished, they do not worry about loan repayments.
Issues related to risk, trust, and perceived complexity represent
informal institutional barriers or social norms that may be difficult
to modify or overcome. However, these norms can be expected to
change over time, as individual homeowners create credit histories
and to the extent that the institutional environment in South Africa
becomes more conducive to establishing and growing a formal
business. However, so long as the institutional environment gives
small business owners incentives to remain small and not grow, the
use of title as collateral can be expected to remain relatively low.
C. High Transaction Costs
In addition to the informal barriers outlined above, other more
formal institutional barriers exist that impede economic
development tied to the benefits of titling.188 These problems are
largely regulatory barriers that could be addressed through policy
changes.
People in Langa are not selling their homes as visibly or,
perhaps, as frequently as one might expect. Sales do take place, but
187. See du Preez & Clayton, supra note 153.
188. For a discussion of other examples of high transaction costs negatively affecting
land markets, see DEININGER, supra note 26, at 97.
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they take place informally - outside the scope of South Africa's
formal transfer process. The main reason for low levels of formal
sales activity in Langa is the high costs of selling a house through
formal channels.
The main cause of the high costs is South African lawyers, some
of who have been given a monopoly over the legal transfer of
property. In order for a deed of transfer to be formally registered
with the registrar at the Deeds Office in South Africa, the parties to
the sale must put their agreement in writing and use the services of
a conveyancing attorney. 189 Conveyancing attorneys prepare sales
and transfer documents and have them signed and sent to the Deeds
Office for review. The Deeds Office records the transfer of
ownership and signs the purchasers' new title deed.
Conveyancing attorneys are the only people who can register
title in the Deeds Office. 190 This monopoly privilege means that
conveyancing attorneys are able to charge higher rates than would
be possible if the market for these services was competitive. When
coupled with transfer duties and stamp duties, this anachronistic
legal procedure stymies the formal transfers of property among
poorer South Africans by raising the cost of transfers. Indeed, the
requirements of this process impose disproportionate burdens on
the poor, who are less able to afford the costs of supporting
conveyancing attorneys.
Table 1 highlights the burden faced by individuals transferring
lower valued property, as compared to those transferring higher
valued property. Recognizing that there are fixed costs associated
with the process of transferring property, these rates are,
nonetheless, indicative of the burdens faced by individuals selling
real estate at the lower end of the market. Given these financial
hurdles, it is no surprise then that the house sales that do take place
in Langa often happen informally and using affidavits. 191

189. DEED REGISTRIES ACT, supra note 148.
190. Id.
191. Interview with Mr. Thabo Manganyi and Ms. Joy McNab, McNab Realtors, in
Cape Town, South Africa, (Oct. 10, 2005).
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Transfer Costs Associated With Conveyancing

92

Total
Fees

Percentage
of Value

106.40

Deeds
Office
Levy
55.00

921.40

5.1%

1,250.00

175.00

55.00

1,480.00

4.9%

1,500.00

210.00

55.00

1,765.00

3.9%

1,800.00

252.00

55.00

2,107.00

3%

2,500.00

252.00

200.00

2,252.00

3.2%

2,500.00

350.00

200.00

3,050.00

3.8%

2,700.00

378.00

200.00

3,278.00

3.6%

2,900.00

406.00

200.00

3,506.00

3.5%

100,000.01

3,000.00

420.00

200.00

3,620.00

2.9%

125,000.00
125,000.01

3,100.00

434.00

200.00

3734.00

2.5%

Value
(Rand)

Transfer
Fees

VAT
(14%)

100.0018,000.00
18,000.0130,000.00
30,000.01 45,000.00
45,000.01 60,000.00
60,000.01 70,000.00
70,000.0180,000.00
80,000.0190,000.00
90,000.01-

760.00

100,000.00

150,000.00

Realtors in South Africa report problems in Langa's property
market. 193 As of 2005, this market was largely inactive, at least formally,
all newly built homes were sold and few of the older properties appeared to
be for sale. 194 Further, improvements to houses, such as the additions of
second stories or gardens, had not been made. Langa also had not updated
its commercial strip to make it a more attractive shopping location. The
value of residential property was unclear as there were few benchmarks to
compare to because of so few sales took place formally.

192. GhostConvey, Tables of Costs with Legislation, http://www.ghostdigest.co.za/
PDF/Tables%20of%20Costs%20with%20Legislation.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
193. Interview with Manganyi and McNab, supra note 191.
194. Based on interviews conducted in the field, housing stock is available, but it may
not be available to an "outsider" real estate agent - instead, it is available through
informal social networks. With a private, informal sale, the sales price may not be
readily accessible, and this would make it more difficult to an outsider to determine
what homes are worth.
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Instead, a large amount of informal trading takes place, indicating that
homes are, in fact, for sale, but not via formal channels. Informal sales are
conducted for cash. These informal sales often do not lead to formal
registration. Instead, parties to the transfer go to the local police station and
fill out an affidavit, which states that the party selling the house is its
owner, as well as who the purchaser is and what the purchase price is. The
affidavit also states that the seller has the right to sell the house. The police
witness the signatures on the affidavit, money changes hands, and after this
informal process, the purchaser takes possession of the house.
These transactions are almost certainly not recorded in the deeds
registry because this process works outside formal channels. This gives
another strong reason to end the conveyancing monopoly. If conveyancing
were easier and less expensive, costs associated with selling property
would be lower and fewer of these informal transfers would result, making
the deeds registry more dependable.
The current process for transferring property imposes significant
transactions costs on sellers and it is not surprising that sellers seek ways to
avoid these costs. In order to effectively address the problem of informal
sales, the government must identify ways to reduce transactions costs
associated with the sale of real property. If addressed, people will respond
with a growing reliance on formal methods of transfer.
The limited availability of commercial credit, including microlending, in Langa may also limit the formal transfer of property and
195
homeowners' abilities to leverage titles to their homes.
Conveyancing costs and lack of credit are not the only problems that
limit the sale of houses in Langa and keep house values lower than they
might otherwise be. Homeowners face another category of obstacles
associated with the lack of capacity and responsiveness of the local
government. Local government does not do enough in Langa to provide a
safe and clean local environment, and it places roadblocks in the path of
commercial and residential property development.
D. Problems With Local Government
Across South Africa, local governments are criticized for lacking
capacity to perform their basic functions: maintaining law and order,
maintaining local infrastructure, providing electricity, and providing trash
and water services. A key reason for these failures is that local
governments have a poor record of effectively collecting "rates" - the
local taxes that support local government activities - and service charges
195. Micro-credit and micro-finance institutions have a limited history in South
Africa. See Meagher & Wilkinson supra note 145, at 4-5.
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for water, trash collection, and electricity use. It may be difficult for
informally employed South Africans to make these regular payments, and
some fall behind in their payments or stop paying. When neighbors learn
that the person next door is not paying the rates or charges, and yet
continues to receive water and electricity, they stop paying as well. People
see that the quality of service is poor so they too do not pay.
And yet, unless you can prove that you have paid these rates for the
three-year period preceding the sale of a house, the sale cannot formally
take place. If people do not want to (or are unable to) pay back rates or
service charges, in addition to conveyancing fees and transfer duties, they
are more likely to sell via informal processes, such as the affidavit of sale.
The requirement that owners prove they have fully paid rates and service
fees before a formal transfer of title can take place creates barriers for many
potential sales.
Figures on the municipal debt levels are staggering. 196 This revenue
shortfall means that local governments have limited abilities to fund and
provide essential services, such as keeping the electricity running and
clearing the trash from streets. Thus, the local government, known as a
council, has a very difficult time upgrading the community - improving
roads, lighting, sidewalks, etc. 197 The local environment in Langa is not as
clean as it would be if the local council worked more efficiently, and this in
turn keeps property values lower than they otherwise would be. People
must divert their funds to deal with issues that the local government is
supposed to address. The result is, in effect, double taxation: business
people spend money buying services that they may have paid taxes (rates)
to supply.
Given the size and scope of the informal sector in South Africa,
collecting rates is extremely difficult. To solve the problem of inefficient
local services provision, the burden on local governments could be reduced
by privatizing more of these activities and by requiring homeowners to pay
a private company for trash collection and electricity. 198 The private
company, rather than local government, would be accountable to
196. In the Auditor-General's report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2003,
municipal debt totaled 32 billion rand. The current figure is probably closer to 40 billion
rand. Describing the debt as a "phenomenal amount of money," the Auditor-General
cited the lack of skilled personnel as one of the key factors behind the failure to collect
debt. See The Rot in ANC Municipalities: Five Case Studies of Cronyism, Corruption and
Ineptitude, THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, at 2, availableat http://www.da.org.za/da/Site/
Eng/campaigns/DOCS/SAAwards4.doc (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
197. Interview with Willem du Toit, Director, Pele Development Service, in Cape
Town, South Africa (Oct. 10, 2006).
198. Privatizing water services presents particular challenges as the South African
Constitution contains rights to certain amounts of water for free. See S. AFR. CONST.
1996, § 27, Art. lb.
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homeowners for the quality of service rendered. Homeowners would face
different incentives in terms of payment. Presumably, a service would
continue to be provided so long as a homeowner paid according to terms
negotiated privately with the service provider. One would expect private
service providers to adopt a flexible payment approach for such customers,
in recognition of the high level of informal employment in townships.
A further problem is that the behavior of council officials is viewed by
some as imperious and obstructionist. 199 This unhelpful behavior seems to
manifest itself most clearly in the issuing of permits to expand or change a
house or business.
The process of applying for building permit is rife with costs and
uncertainty for the homeowner. Plans are supposed to be presented to the
council for officials to either approve, modify, or reject. A draftsman is
supposed to draw up these plans, another expense for the homeowner.
There are no draftsmen in Langa or in nearby Guguletu Township so those
attempting to improve their homes must travel outside the townships to hire
someone. The council might take months to approve a plan, so some
people simply ignore the process and go build without a permit. To the
extent that council officials impose these kinds of costs on residents, they
hinder local development.
Compared to other black townships in the Cape Town area, Langa has
relatively low crime rates.20 0
However, compared to more affluent
locations around Cape Town, Langa's rates are high. 201 Higher crime rates
reduce the value of property, making titles a less valuable asset than they
are for people who live in low-crime areas. The crime rate in Langa, while
lower than in near by townships, is still high enough that it imposes costs
on business owners and on local residents.
Many businesses would like to stay open later in the evenings but are
too concerned about crime to do that now, resulting in hours of lost
revenue. 202 Further, producers are too concerned about crime to make
deliveries to Langa, so buyers are forced to purchase their goods from
middlemen, raising costs.
In a high crime environment, homeowners may limit their home
improvement projects. If one's house is too nice, it may signal wealth to
possible thieves and make the house or its owners targets. To some extent,
199. Interview with Vicky Mangaliso, supra note 134.
200. For information on numbers of crimes committed in Langa compared to
Guguletu, Nyanga, or Mitchell's Plain see Crime Statistics, Western Cape, http://www.
saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2005/western cape.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2007). Information on numbers of crimes comnmitted in more affluent areas such as
Camps Bay can also be found here.
201. Id.
202. Interview with Mangaliso, supranote 136.
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the relatively low crime rates in Langa may reflect effective self-policing in
the community. Many Langa residents have lived in the township for
decades. They know neighbors and neighbors' children and will monitor
what happens in their area. This self-monitoring is a benefit to Langa
residents. However, more effective law enforcement would be a major
benefit to the residents and business owners in Langa.
Many point to the lack of mortgage financing for low-income earners
as a problem in the South African environment. Some of the reasons why
there is relatively little lending activity in townships like Langa are
discussed above. While it remains true that banks to date have done
relatively little to lend to those earning less than 5,000 rand per month,
change may be on the horizon. 203 The poor may be credit risks, and banks
may have done too little to determine credit histories, but some critics point
to regulatory barriers, the lack of proper framework to support such
banking services, usury laws, corruption, and erratic law enforcement as
equally important problems. 204 Addressing these concerns may allow for
greater experimentation in credit markets and increased borrowing options
for the poor. Large banks in the developing world are increasingly entering
the market to serve low-income borrowers. 205 Assuming this trend also
develops in South Africa, the credit market should thicken in ways that
benefit township owners in Langa and elsewhere.
E.

Problems of Starting and Doing Business in South Africa

Just like Americans, South Africans can start businesses. However,
while it is relatively easy and inexpensive for Americans to create a formal
business, it is complicated and costly for South Africans to do the same, 206
leading many entrepreneurs opt to open informal businesses.
If
government policies made it easier for small businesses to grow and
expand, the pace of economic development would increase.

203. For example, in 2005, South African bank Absa began offering a product entitled
"My Home," which allows low-income earners to apply for 110% mortgage loans. See
Joan Muller, Banks Take the Leap, EPROP COMMERCIAL PROP. MARKETPLACE, Oct. 12, 2005,

http://www.eprop.co.za/news/article.aspx?idArticle=6399.
204. The Hidden Wealth of the Poor,supra note 184.
205. See Karol Boudreaux & Tyler Cowen, The Micromagic of Microcredit, THE WILSON
Q., Winter 2008, at 2-4 (providing examples of banks entering low income markets); See
generally Tom Marshall, Bond Issue Lets Investors Buy Into Microfinance, WALL ST. J., Apr.
26, 2006, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114610401811537243.html.
206. Doing Business, South Africa, http://www.doingbusiness.org/Explore
Economies/?economyid=172 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Doing Business,
South Africa].
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According to the World Bank's annual Doing Business report, South
African entrepreneurs can expect to go through eight steps, taking an
average of 31 days, at a cost equal to 7.1 percent of GNI per capita, to start
a business. 207 In contrast, the average American entrepreneur can expect
to go through six steps, taking an average of six days, at a cost of 0.7
percent of GNI per capita, to launch a business. 2 8 The greater complexity
and costliness of this start-up process provides incentives for businesses in
South Africa to operate informally.
In addition, the costs of growing a business are much higher for South
Africans than for Americans. Labor laws, minimum wage laws, licensing
and permitting requirements, and other regulatory requirements that apply
to larger businesses increase the costs of moving from the informal to the
20 9
formal sector, and provide disincentives to grow and formalize.
Again, according to the Doing Business reports, the average South
African employer faces a Difficulty of Hiring index of fifty-six out of one
hundred, as opposed to zero in the U.S.210 In the area of Rigidity of Hours,
South Africa scored forty, whereas the U.S. received a zero. 211 In the area
of Difficulty of Firing an Individual, South Africa scored thirty. 212 In
comparison the U.S. received a zero. 213 With regards to the Overall
Rigidity of Employment Index, which is an average of the three indices,
South Africa received forty-two compared with the United States' score of
zero. 214
These figures highlight a continuing problem with the institutional
environment in South Africa: the high costs associated with hiring and
firing limit formal-sector employment opportunities for many South
Africans. Because it is so costly to employ people in the formal sector,
South Africa's informal sector continues to grow. But the millions of
people employed informally have difficulty accessing commercial credit,
207. Id.
208. Doing Business, United States, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ Explore
EconomFies/?economyid=197 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Doing Business,
United States].
209. See generally DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 7 (discussing the problems of
formalization).
210. Doing Business, South Africa, supra note 206; See Doing Business, United States,
supra note 208.
211. Doing Business, United States, supra note 208.
212. Doing Business, South Africa, supranote 206.
213. Doing Business, United States, supra note 208.
214. Doing Business, South Africa, supra note 206; Doing Business, United States,
supra note 208. For more on this topic see Jasson Urbach, Costs Reduce Formal Jobs & Push
People into the Informal Sector, FREE MARKET FOuND., July 5, 2005,
http://www.freemarketfoundation.com/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleType=Bulletin&Articl
eId=2335 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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which means their ability to participate in the formal housing market is also
limited. These institutional concerns must be addressed if the South
African government wishes to further unleash the entrepreneurial drive of
its citizens.

VI. Policy Implications
Property goes beyond possession and ownership. It is essentially
about building institutions. Like government and money, formal
property is established through human agreements for very
215
specific utilitarian purposes.
The problems outlined above suggest that in order for titling programs
to have the greatest positive impact in terms of the legal empowerment of
the poor, they must take place in an institutional environment that:
* allows for relatively easy and low-cost formal transfers;
" encourages the creative use of property;
* encourages the growth and expansion of businesses; and
• provides opportunities for individuals to work with local officials
to improve their local environment.
These conditions may be most likely to occur in urban, rather than
rural settings. For many homeowners who work in the informal economy,
it is simply too risky to use title to their house as collateral. South Africans
are, by no means, alone in this concern. It is risky for American
entrepreneurs to use title to their home as collateral also. In the United
States, most capital used to start a business comes from personal and family
savings, not from loans secured with title to a house. 216 This reasonable
concern means that the government should not assume that providing title,
by itself, is enough to promote economic growth and development. Titling
may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, means to spur economic activity.
The government needs to provide secure title that can be registered in
a relatively low-cost manner. If homeowners transfer property informally,
as they are currently doing in Langa, the benefits of costly titling efforts
will largely be lost. An undependable, out-of-date deeds register fails to
capture the on-the-ground reality of the property environment. For this
reason, such a register is, to a significant extent, useless. In order to
provide homeowners with greater incentives to use the formal transfer and

215. Hemando de Soto, Dead Capital & the Poor, 21(1) SAIS REV., 11 (2001).
216. See BHIDE, supra note 166, at 37-38.
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registration process, the government should look for ways to reduce
transactions costs. Government officials should also focus on developing
policies and programs that promote security and predictability within the
transfer process. However, they must also broaden their concerns beyond
providing title - a valuable first step - to reducing red tape and the high
cost of formality, so that more South Africans have incentives to use their
property in creative ways.
Experience in Langa suggests that the efforts of the South African

government to provide title to a house to many citizens have produced real
benefits to urban homeowners and to local artisans but that these benefits
are not tied to the use of title as collateral. As land-tenure experts Alain
Durand-Lasserve and Harris Selod point out in a recent paper:
Granting property titles may have other effects than through
investments and enhanced market functioning. It can also play a
role in empowering vulnerable communities and individuals.
The key idea is that formalization can free individuals from
constraining social relations. It can free households from a
dependency on stakeholders that benefit from the perpetuation of
informality and insecurity (local leaders, shack lords, or even
municipal and government officials involved in the delivery of
parallel informal land market parcels.) 2 17
The benefits in Langa include such empowerment. The benefits are
this urban titling project are also tied to incremental improvements and
business development efforts undertaken by homeowners. Homeowners
are reluctant to use their title as collateral for commercial credit, but they
will save and invest. In the current institutional environment, however,
homeowners who run a home-based business face disincentives to move
their business into the formal sector. And, due to high transactions costs,
homeowners face disincentives to use the formal transfer process. This
leads to increased insecurity, and reduced stability and predictability in the
real estate market. These insights suggest that if policy makers wish to
strengthen the link between titling programs, economic development, and
poverty alleviation, they should consider the adoption of the following:
The government should end the monopoly held by conveyancing
attorneys if they wish to further empower poor homeowners and new
buyers. There is simply no good reason why one specialized type of
attorney should be required to transfer a title deed. While the person
transferring title must be properly trained to identify possible problems in

217. Alain Durand-Lasserve & Harris Selod, The Formalisationof Urban Land Tenure in
Developing Countries, WORLD BANK'S FOURTH URBAN RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM, May 14-16,

2007, at 13 (emphasis in original).
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any given record, a specialized attorney is not needed to perform this
function. A well-trained legal assistant could do the same work at a much
lower cost. The key concern should be to ensure the legal reliability of the
transfer, not to provide a monopoly privilege to a small group. If
government officials want more homeowners to follow this formal process,
they should consider: abolishing the conveyancing monopoly and
introducing more competition into the conveyancing market. 218 If the
government wants to ensure that more property is transferred in ways that
promote security, dependability, and predictability for sellers and buyers, it
should focus on reducing the cost of the transfer process.
There is a strong need to make it easier for small businesses, started
with personal savings, to enter the formal sector. Residents of Langa
readily start businesses, but the high cost of creating and maintaining a
formal business in South Africa means these businesses are likely to be and
remain informal. South Africa has a host of policies that raise the costs of
doing business in the country, and these policies create disincentives for
businesses to formalize and grow. Government should do more to make it
easier for South Africans to enter formally into a business, employ workers,
and fire workers when necessary. They should also work to reduce the
costs associated with regulatory compliance.
Residents express frustration and dissatisfaction with the level of
services that municipal councils provide. Local government capacity must
be addressed in order to upgrade the environment in townships like Langa
and across South Africa.
This might mean providing increased
opportunities for private businesses to compete to provide services that are
now the responsibility of local government. If services such as trash
collection and electricity were offered privately to township residents, a
different set of incentives from those that currently operate would exist.
Homeowners would have less incentive to avoid payment, because there
would be real consequences to a failure to pay. Private companies, for their
part, would have incentives to develop flexible payment options in
recognition of the large number of homeowners who work in the informal
sector. Providing these services privately should increase the quality of
services homeowners receive because of increased competition. This
would relieve strain on local governments. At the same time, policy
makers should focus on improving councilor accountability and
218. New Zealand has removed the special privilege that attorneys once held to
formally transfer property. Today, specialist non-lawyers (known in New Zealand as
conveyancers) have the legal right to convey property. The effect of this law removing
this previous privilege is to provide consumers with more choice and make the
conveyancing market in New Zealand more competitive. See Kevin Taylor, Lawyer
Reform a Step Forward, N.Z. HERALD (Aukland, New Zealand), July 30, 2003, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c-id=l&objectid=3515360.
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government transparency at the local level in order to promote competition
among localities and to present residents with the best possible information
concerning the efficiency of the local government.
Conclusion
I can tell you that in every country, the law is hostile to the poor.
It has not been made for the poor, and it is inaccessible to them.
So the next thing that you have to understand is that the number
one instrument is law ...It has to do with law and the possibility
of creating a legal system that will make the poor want to enter it
so they can start leveraging things and connecting to the real
market economy. And that involves understanding that you have
to do reforms that go beyond titling,
that have to do with literally
9
integrating the extralegal system.21
Hernando de Soto is surely right to say that improving the lives of the
poor in the developing world - in places like Langa Township - goes
beyond mere titling. He argues that it has to do with developing a "larger
formalization process that converts 'property' into 'capital."' 220 However,
the legal empowerment of the poor is about even more than converting
property into capital. Legal empowerment is about creating an institutional
environment that enables the poor to flourish in an environment with a
viable rule of law that provides employment, health, and educational
opportunity and choice.
The South African government's long-standing policy of transferring
title from the public sector to private individuals is one important step on
the road towards the legal empowerment of the poor. By formalizing and
securing property rights, the South African government has shifted
incentives for the poor to conserve and improve their homes. The
government has created opportunities for the poor to seize entrepreneurial
options. The result is some increase in housing values, some job creation,
and some poverty alleviation. But, the policy represents only the beginning
phases of a journey. As de Soto suggests, titling by itself cannot
miraculously whisk the poor from the world of extralegality (or
informality) to the doorsteps of the formal, commercial world - much
more is needed.
Government should recognize that titling efforts in urban areas, such
as Langa Township, may be more cost-effective than are titling efforts in
219. Dave Kruger, Fighting Poverty with Property Law, ASIAN DEV. BANK REV.,
Mar./Apr. 2003, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB-Review/2003/
vo135_2/Hernando deSotoVision.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
220. See DE SOTO, MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 12.
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rural areas. In places where the potential for a high return on investment in
property exists, then the costs associated with implementing a titling
program may be worthwhile. 221 However, if other transaction costs are
high, buyers and sellers may quickly resort to informal transfers - a
process that quickly makes a titling program both irrelevant and a costly
failure.
Further, it is unlikely that titling in a troubled institutional
environment will lead to widespread use of titles as collateral for
commercial loans. Evidence from the United States suggests that the startup capital for most small businesses comes from personal savings. 222 This
same pattern applies in Langa Township. Important differences exist,
however, between the experiences of the typical American small business
owner and a small business owner in Langa. The township business owner
is much more likely to be operating informally because the costs associated
with running a formal business, employing labor, and complying with
regulations discourage them from expanding their operations. This is
where government policies to promote economic growth and alleviate
poverty should focus.
In many parts of the developing world using house titles as collateral
for commercial loans is extremely risky, making it likely that the use of
such loans will remain low as long as institutional constraints remain. 223 So
long as they are employed informally, have little credit history, and face an
institutional environment that provides disincentives to formalize, the poor
may prefer to use personal savings and savings clubs to finance home
improvement and business development. Until greater opportunity exists
for formal employment, the poor will likely continue to rely on personal
savings and savings clubs to build businesses and improve their homes.
For titling policies to have the greatest usefulness as tool to empower
the poor, they should be accompanied by complementary institutional
reforms that reduce the costs of property transfers, make it easier to grow
small businesses, and generate increased accountability and improved
service provision at the local level. Ideally, the government should focus
on developing an institutional environment that:
*
*
"
*

abolishes the property conveyancing monopoly;
allows for lower-cost legally reliable property transfers;
makes it easier for small, informal businesses to grow and expand;
provides increased opportunities for formal employment; and

221. See generally, Jacoby & Minten, supra note 13.
222. BHIDE, supra note 166, at 37-38.
223. Durand-Lasserve & Selod supra note 217, at 12-13.
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provides for the alternative provision of local services.
The lesson of Langa Township is that while titling helps to put some
life into what might be called dead capital, by itself titling policies go only
so far towards the legal empowerment of South Africa's poor. While titles
help shift incentives in positive directions, further institutional reform is
needed to reduce transaction costs, to encourage homes owners to transfer
property formally, and to encourage business owners to grow and expand
their businesses.
The legal environment can be a vehicle for
empowerment, but broader reforms are still needed to accomplish the
LEP's goal of providing the world's poor with a "legitimate stake in the
economy."

